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The Ottoman Empire in Recent
International Politics ‒ I: The Case of Kuwait
G   than  years have passed since the tsar of Russia,Nicholas I, first called the Ottoman Empire ‘the Sick Man ofEurope’, and that we are not far from the centenary of the Sick
Man’s death, the role the empire plays in both regional and international
politics is surprising. Governments across much of the territory once part
of the empire have used accepted, nurtured images of Ottoman oppression
or decadence to boost national solidarity and also, on occasion, to promote
controversial policies. While the fate of Armenians in the First World War
currently receives the widest public attention, in the recent past other
contentious disputes in formerly Ottoman lands, from Yugoslavia to Iraq,
also have fed off politicized history. As a rule, the Ottoman history cited by
political activists is slanted at best, or pernicious at worst. Yet such his-
tories attract credulous audiences, not only within the countries con-
cerned, but also internationally. The reluctance of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) to intervene in the wars of Yugoslavia’s dis-
integration, to cite one well-known example, arose from belief in Balkan
‘national’ versions of history characterized by ethnic conflict, including
oppression under the Ottomans: efforts to halt ‘ancient hatreds’ would be
futile, because Muslim, Orthodox, and Catholic always have slaughtered
each other in the Balkans.1 In the Yugoslav case and others, the motives
and credibility of the political activists who cited Ottoman history
deserved to be treated with greater scepticism than they were.
Although few people alive today have a personal memory of life in the
Ottoman Empire, the stark, nationalist reading of its history is readily
accepted because many carry in their hearts and minds a strong vision of
what it must have been like. School curricula and popular mythology in
most post-Ottoman nation states have cultivated an image of the empire
1 For the effect of Robert Kaplan’s shallow Balkan Ghosts () on the president of the United States,
William J. Clinton, and his advisers, see, e.g., Yugoslavia and Its Historians: Understanding the Bal-
kan Wars of the s, ed. N. Naimark and H. Case (Stanford, ), p. xv, and S. Ramet, Balkan
Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milo≤evi≥ (Boulder, ),
p. .
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that paints ‘the Terrible Turk’ as the antonym of desired national char-
acteristics and as solely responsible for relative political or economic back-
wardness.1 A variation on this tendency can be seen in Turkey, which
experienced a revulsion against the imperial legacy following the founding
of the republic in .2 The incontrovertible, widespread misery that ac-
companied each stage of the empire’s break-up makes this negative image
easily believable.
Among the most effective tools for working the anti-Ottoman message
into the national, and nationalist, histories of the successor states has been
their control of education and the media. The state in the Balkans, Turkey,
and the Arab lands has tended to control, either directly through finance
and administration or indirectly through legislated restrictions, not only
schools and television but also the academy (universities, research insti-
tutes, and publishing houses), in which state-sponsored national history
predominates. Universities in the successor states have produced sur-
prisingly few historians of the empire; the training they offer has been
geared to producing specialists in national history during the Ottoman
period. The proclivity of such historians to concentrate on the ‘national re-
birth’ and ‘independence struggle’ phases of their nations’ Ottoman past
has been one sign of the strength of the national paradigm.3 The propa-
gandist model of history, pushed by the state, has established effective
boundaries to deviation: scholars and literati who have strayed over them
have risked public vilification and harassment. The prosecution of Orhan
Pamuk by the Turkish government in  for comments about the killing
of Armenians in the First World War is a recent, high-profile example.
The stereotype of ‘Turkish domination’ fostered by nation-builders
gives a veneer of historical justification to extremist politics. While the
policies promoted by skewed history may face criticism from international
law and human rights, the ‘history’ disseminated to justify them to public
opinion has lived on and proved influential abroad as well as at home.
Every citation of Ottoman history to explain current events warrants more
critical attention.
1 See C. Jelavich, South Slav Nationalisms: Textbooks and Yugoslav Union before  (Columbus,
); and Oil on Fire? Textbooks, Ethnic Stereotypes, and Violence in Southeast Europe , ed. W. Höp-
ken (Hanover, ).
2 See B. Ersanlı, ‘The Ottoman Empire in the Historiography of the Kemalist Era: A Theory of Fatal
Decline’, in The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography, ed. F. Adanır and S.
Faroqhi (Leiden, ), pp. -.
3 M. Todorova, ‘The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans’, and K. Barbir, ‘Memory, Heritage, and History:
The Ottomans and the Arabs’, in Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the
Middle East, ed. L. C. Brown (New York, ), pp. -, -; R. Abou-el-Haj, ‘The Social Uses
of the Past: Recent Arab Historiography of Ottoman Rule’, International Journal of Middle East
Studies, xiv (), -; G. Hering, ‘Die Osmanenzeit im Selbstverständnis der Völker Südost-
europas’, in Die Staaten Südosteuropas und die Osmanen, ed. H. G. Majer (Munich, ), pp. -.
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Manipulation of Ottoman history, which takes several forms, has been
applied to a variety of national purposes other than nation-building. The
straw man of the ‘Terrible Turk’ is used to mobilize popular antagonism
towards everything Muslim and/or Turkish, most pervasively in the Balkan
states. Whereas Arab nationalist regimes, such as Baathist Iraq and Syria,
have placed greater emphasis on the anti-Turkish, rather than anti-Mus-
lim, message, the secular regime in Turkey has stressed the weakness of
the explicitly Muslim Ottoman state and the problems caused by other
ethnic groups, both Muslim and Christian. Similarly, selective evidence
from the Ottoman era is used to build support for a specific goal, usually a
claim to land. The two manipulations have been most effective when used
in tandem. The purposes to which manipulated, politicized, history lends
itself include both domestic and foreign policy issues. Five categories of
politics in the guise of Ottoman history have recurred regularly since the
end of the empire in .
The first category is border disputes arising from the dissolution of the
Ottoman Empire. Some cases of politics-as-history claim that territories
were wrongfully divided from their natural ethnic, social, or economic hin-
terlands. The most widely known instances are the long-running dispute
over Macedonia and the briefly realized Iraqi claim to Kuwait. In the case
of Macedonia, historical and ethnic claims to territory based on Ottoman
and pre-Ottoman history have been asserted by Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia,
and the Macedonian Slavs; the historical disputes continued long after the
Balkan Wars of -, fought to decide the fate of Ottoman Macedonia.1
In the case of Kuwait, the Iraqi version of history, since the s, claims
that Kuwait was an integral part of Ottoman Iraq until the British in 
bought the allegiance of a Kuwaiti sheikh with a secret treaty. Other terri-
torial disputes have included those between Turkey and Britain and Iraq
over Mosul; Turkey and Syria over Alexandretta; Qatar and Bahrain over
the Hawar islands and Zubara; and over the status of Lebanon as a histor-
ically legitimate entity independent of Syria.2 While the idea of historic
oppression by the Ottomans plays a part in these disputes, the salient form
of historical distortion is the avowal of claims ‘legitimated’ by manu-
factured, misinterpreted, or anecdotal evidence from the Ottoman era.
1 B. Jelavich, History of the Balkans: The Twentieth Century (Cambridge, ), pp. -; M.
Mazower, The Balkans: A Short History (New York, ), pp. -. On recent historical disputes,
see Ramet, Balkan Babel, pp. -, -; L. Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism
in a Transnational World (Princeton, ); The New Macedonian Question, ed. J. Pettifer (New York,
).
2 For Syria and the Lebanon, see D. Pipes, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition (Oxford, );
P. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, - (Princeton, );
and N. Weinberger, Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: The - Civil War (Oxford, ). For Iraq,
see C. Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge, ).
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The second category is claims to sacred land. The most obvious cases of
the use of Ottoman ‘history’ to assert rights to ‘historic heartlands’ not in-
habited predominantly by members of the group making the claim are
Kosovo and Palestine. Serbs have treated Kosovo as crucial to their
national identity, despite having been a minority of its inhabitants since at
least the nineteenth century.1 According to their version of their history,
the Ottoman Empire stripped them of control over Kosovo following the
battle of Kosovo Polje in , in which the Serbian king, Lazar, chose a
heavenly kingdom over the preservation of his earthly one. Later, in ,
the Ottomans supposedly drove Serbs out of Kosovo and resettled the land
with Albanians to ensure that the evicted Serbs could not return.2
In the dispute over Palestine, the first generations of Zionists expressed
their idea of the area under Ottoman rule with the slogan ‘a land without a
people for a people without a land’. They implied that Palestine was
sparsely populated in the late Ottoman period, impoverished by govern-
ment incompetence, corruption, and inability to stop Bedouin banditry.3
Immigration by Zionists could only benefit Palestine, by making the desert
bloom, an idea developed by later propagandists who assert that a Pales-
tinian state would implode, as it could not develop a sustainable economy.
Palestinians have responded by highlighting the vibrancy of the Arab com-
munities in Palestine before the onset of significant Zionist immigration.4
The debates over the history of Ottoman Palestine have led recently to
research in quantities unusual in the successor states; more unusual has
been the freedom to challenge the nationalist history enjoyed by Israeli
scholars, among whom are some of the best Ottomanists at work today.5
The third category is the origins of the communities of Muslims in
1 Determination of the ethnicity of Ottoman populations before the nineteenth century is a practical
impossibility, for reasons to be discussed in the second article of this series.
2 On the importance of Kosovo to Serbia’s sense of history, see A. Dragnich and S. Todorovich, The
Saga of Kosovo: Focus on Serbian-Albanian Relations (Boulder, ), and D. Batakovi≥, The Kosovo
Chronicles (Belgrade, ).
3 B. Netanyahu, A Place among the Nations: Israel and the World (New York, ), pp. -; J.
Peters, From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict over Palestine (New York,
). See also the standard-setting H. Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our
Time (New York, ), p. ,  and M. Gilbert, Israel: A History (London, ). Gilbert writes of
vibrant Jewish communities living in Palestine ‘despite the dull hand of Turkish bureaucracy’ (p. ).
He asserts that the Jewish population had risen to roughly one-quarter of the Arab population already
by  (p. ), even though research in Ottoman population statistics has shown this figure to be false.
On Ottoman Palestine, see J. McCarthy, The Population of Palestine: Population History and Statistics
of the Late Ottoman Period and the Mandate  (New York, ), pp. -.
4 B. Doumani, ‘Rediscovering Ottoman Palestine: Writing Palestinians into History’, Journal of Pales-
tine Studies, xxi (), -. See also idem, Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal
Nablus, - (Berkeley, ).
5 On Ottoman Palestine, see, e.g., H. Gerber, Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem, -  (Berlin, ),
and Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period , ed. D. Kushner (Jerusalem, ). Gerber and other Israeli
scholars have shown unusual interest in Ottoman subjects unrelated to their homeland’s past.
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Europe. Balkan states have repeatedly wished to solve a ‘problem’ in-
herited from the Ottoman Empire: the continued existence of large Muslim
minorities. At root, this is a product of an enduring desire to be recognized
as ‘European’, rather than as ‘Oriental’ and thus dim, decadent, and des-
potic. Significant Muslim populations are blemishes on the Balkan nations’
self-image. To determine the exact origins of Balkan Muslim populations is
impossible, but they include local converts, Turkish-speaking settlers,
relocated refugees, and migrants. While nation-builders in the Balkans
have preferred to view Muslims as descendants of local converts, rather
than of Turkish settlers, the issue of conversion presents its own ideo-
logical problems. How could members of the nation ‘turn Turk’? Forced
conversion has been one ready explanation.1 Bulgaria, faced with eco-
nomic and political sclerosis in the s, initiated a programme designed
to Bulgarize its large Turkish minority that took previous attempts to ‘re-
nationalize’ both Bulgarian- and Turkish-speaking Muslims to a more
brutal level. Official history claimed that the large Turcophone Muslim
minority was not ethnically Turkish but descended from Bulgarians
forcibly converted to Islam in the seventeenth century. This ersatz history
was hardly to the taste of Bulgaria’s Turks, tens of thousands of whom fled
the country to escape the renunciation of their religion and the acceptance
of Bulgarian names forced upon them at gunpoint.2
The issue of the origin of Muslim populations also played an obvious
role not only in Kosovo, but also in the war in Bosnia. Serbs (and to an
extent Croats) portrayed Bosnian Muslims as descendants of Serbs (or
Croats) whom the Ottomans forced or enticed to convert. Thus, the ab-
sorption of Bosnia into Serbia and Croatia would right an anomaly in-
herited from the Ottoman Empire. Bosnia’s Muslims traced their roots to
the independent medieval kingdom of Bosnia, which, supposedly, had
been a stronghold of non-Catholic, non-Orthodox, Bogomil Christianity.3
Even in Albania with its Muslim majority, national history tends to explain
conversion as a simple issue of convenience, as Albanians supposedly
never cared much about religion.4 On these grounds, Enver Hoxha’s
1 For modern attitudes to conversion, see A. Zhelyazkova, ‘Islamization in the Balkans as an Historio-
graphical Problem: The Southeast European Perspective’, in Balkans , ed. Adanır and Faroqhi, pp.
-. See also M. Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (Oxford, ), pp. - for historiographic
tendencies in south-eastern Europe, including the issue of conversion.
2 On Bulgaria’s Turkish minority, see M. Neuburger, The Orient Within: Muslim Minorities and the
Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria (Ithaca, ). On the anti-Turkish policies of the Bul-
garian government during the s, see The Turks of Bulgaria: The History, Culture, and Political
Fate of a Minority, ed. K. H. Karpat (Madison, ).
3 For a review of these tendencies, see N. Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York, ) and
idem, Kosovo: A Short History (New York, ). The claim of Bogomil roots for Bosnia’s Muslims is
challenged effectively by J. Fine, The Bosnian Church: A New Interpretation (Boulder, ).
4 S. Skendi, Balkan Cultural Studies  (Boulder, ), pp. -.
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regime enforced atheism. Political campaigns to obliterate Muslim minor-
ities in the Balkans have made little use of even selective documentary evi-
dence. In the case supported by the clearest evidence ‒ that of the forced
conversions of Bulgarians in the seventeenth century ‒ the documents
cited proved to have been nineteenth-century forgeries.1
Related to the issue of the origins of Muslim communities is the fourth
category: the nature of the relationship between religious and ethnic com-
munities under Ottoman rule. While Arab nationalists assert that ethnicity
separated Arabs from their Turkish overlords, the most notable case of dis-
agreement about intercommunal relations in the Ottoman period involves
Cyprus. Greek Cypriots, who seek the reunification of the island, and
independence, cite a history that stresses the unity of the island and its
people (in resistance to Istanbul’s ‘oppression’), and claims that many
Turkish Cypriots are descendants of local converts to Islam during the
Ottoman period. Turkish Cypriots cite a history of separation of Christian
and Muslim communities on the island and claim descent from immigrants
from Ottoman Anatolia.2
The fifth category is state brutality, the political condition often associ-
ated with the word Ottoman, the negative image at its purest. Relations
between two members of NATO, Greece and Turkey, have been be-
devilled by animosities inherited from the Ottoman period, when brutal
unconventional war was waged by both sides from the Greek revolt of the
s to the Greek occupation of western Anatolia in -. Similarly, in
the politicking over the fate of the Armenians during the First World War,
Armenians charge the Ottomans (Turks) with genocide and Turks reject
the charge.3 Every nationalism to arise in the post-Ottoman states has
claimed that ‘the Turks’ oppressed the nation: the ‘Turkish Yoke’ became
a generic explanation in Balkan states for lack of economic development in
comparison with Germany, France, and Britain.4 The idea that the nation
had sacrificed itself to save ‘Europe’ from the heathen horde survived into
the Communist period, when nationalism might have been subverted as
incompatible with class ideology. The ‘Turkish Yoke’ became the most
1  M. Kiel, Art and Society in Bulgaria in the Turkish Period  (Assen, ), and Zhelyazkova,
‘Islamization’.
2 See, e.g., S. Panteli, A New History of Cyprus (London, ), pp. -; C. Kyrris, History of Cyprus
(Nicosia, ), pp. -; A. Gazio∂lu, The Turks in Cyprus, a Province of the Ottoman Empire (-
) (London, ), ch. ; H. Salih, Cyprus: An Analysis of Cypriot Political Discord (New York,
), chs. -.
3 J. McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, - (Princeton,
); V. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia
to the Caucasus (Providence, ).
4 Kiel, Art and Society, pp. -, offers a good critique of what he terms the dominant ‘catastrophe
theory’ of the cataclysmic effects of Turkish conquest and rule.
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acceptable explanation for the lack of both a significant capitalist class and
a true proletariat, and hence the lack of enthusiasm for progressive totali-
tarianism.1 It also helped to demonize Turkey, the powerful anchor of
NATO’s eastern flank. Only in Yugoslavia did the danger from old-style
nationalism outweigh the benefits, given the patched-together multi-ethnic
character of the state. Even in the Middle East during the post-
nationalist struggle for independence from British and French control,
Arabs adopted the notion that Ottoman internal repression and external
weakness had left them vulnerable to European imperialism.2
Several characteristics of such intersections of history and politics are
worth noting. The first is the anachronism of the modern nationalists’
vision. Shaping policy in the present to address a perceived problem of the
past is hardly wise, even if fairly common. If the military have long been
lambasted for getting ready to fight the last war, in which senior com-
manders held junior rank, what should be said of politicians who want to
rewrite a history of which they have had no personal experience? To use
‘the Turks’ as justification is to betray ignorance of the nature and interests
of the Ottoman state, its relationship with its subjects, and the attitudes
and beliefs of the population. Such actions exaggerate the immutability of
group identities, and assume that the nation state is timeless, without
beginning, end, or significant evolution. This assumption, accepted un-
consciously by many, became the worldwide standard only in the twen-
tieth century, often after much bloodshed.3 Officially sanctioned histories
treat Muslims in the Balkans, for example, as descendants of members of
the nation (be it Bulgarian, Serbian, or Albanian) who were urged or
forced to convert, not only because of their membership in a nation that
resisted oppression, but also because the Ottoman oppressors were as in-
tolerant of heterogeneity among their subjects as present-day Balkan
nationalist states. In Cyprus, Greek Cypriots can no more conceive of
Ottoman Istanbul as having been the ultimate source of redress against
misdeeds by local notables, than Turkish Cypriots can imagine a society
characterized by regular interaction across communal lines (let alone pas-
sage through the lines by conversion): both groups read current nationalist
norms back through the centuries. Yet the evidence for less violent,
routine relations in the pre-national age is there for anyone who cares to
look.4
1 For a socialist view of the Balkans under Ottoman rule, see N. Todorov, The Balkan City, -
(Seattle, ).
2 For the path-breaking version, see G. Antonius, The Arab Awakening (London, ).
3 Although focused on the suffering of Muslims, McCarthy’s Death and Exile conveys the level of
violence that accompanied each stage of the Ottoman Empire’s dissolution into nation states.
4 See R. Jennings, Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the Mediterranean World, -
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Closely related to anachronism is the lack of domestic debate about
these versions of national history. The successor nations to the Ottomans
have no monopoly on the use of history to buttress arguments over current
policy. The vindication of historical claims is one of the few remaining
justifications for the offensive in international disputes that holds much
credibility.1 China and Japan have turned a dispute over history books
used in schools into an expression of their rival political and economic
ambitions in Asia. For variations on the theme of mythologized history in
the United States, one can look to Washington in , where supposed
parallels between Saddam Hussein’s aims and the Cuban missile crisis of
 were drawn repeatedly by those in favour of firm action in defence of
freedom in the Middle East. Comparisons between post-war Iraq and the
Allied occupations of Japan and Germany after  also became fashion-
able among pundits, as did citations of lessons from Britain’s struggle to
control Iraq in the s; they distracted attention from the debate over the
extent to which US plans suited present-day conditions. Yet at least the
analogies were debated in the media, particularly in newspapers such as
the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and the Washington Post. In
most of the Ottoman cases, dissenting voices have been weaker; populist
myths have been allowed to set the parameters of debate. History is
assumed to prove the justice of a claim to a territory or people.
Such myths have been constructed with impunity because Ottoman
history is an orphan, lacking a guardian state able and determined to rebut
derogatory assertions. The Ottoman Empire is gone, and modern Turkey
is far from being its reincarnation: neither can tell Ottoman tales. Ottoman
Turkish is a language as dead as the empire that used it, which makes the
investigation of Ottoman records laborious and time-consuming. Nonethe-
less, the research proves worthwhile. Some claims have weakened in
strength ‒ those concerning Bulgarian conversion and unpopulated Pales-
tine ‒ partly owing to the critical mass of published scholarship.2 In other
cases, arguments that rest upon other than Ottoman sources leave un-
answered the question: what information have we inherited from the
            
(New York, ). For the social interaction of mixed communities elsewhere in the empire, see also U.
Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century
Ottoman Lebanon (Berkeley, ); M. Greene, A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early
Modern Mediterranean (Princeton, ); and A. Marcus, The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity:
Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century (New York, ). For an overview of intercommunal relations
throughout the empire, see D. Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, - (Cambridge, ).
1 A. B. Murphy, ‘Historical Justifications for Territorial Claims’, Annals of the Association of American
Geographers, lxxx (), -.
2 See, for Palestine, A. Schölch, Palestine in Transformation, -: Studies in Social, Economic,
and Political Development, trans. W. Young and M. Garrity (Washington, ); Doumani, Redis-
covering Palestine; and T. Philipp, Acre: The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian City, - (New York,
).
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Ottomans themselves?1 The Ottoman records, by adding shades of grey to
the black-and-white history of nationalist policy makers, reveal the folly of
(mis)using history to justify policy.
This article and another to follow examine in detail the complementary
cases of Kuwait and Kosovo. The former involves an attempt to erase a
modern border and add territory to a nation state, whereas the latter,
which focuses on the ethno-national character of one region in a nation
state, has evolved into a question of secession. The two cases draw on
different elements of Ottoman history: the argument over the status of
Kuwait, which attracted attention shortly before the First World War, is
also part of European imperial history, while that over the ethnic status of
Kosovo, which dates back to the fourteenth century, belongs to the history
of Ottoman domestic affairs. Although the case of Kuwait draws on the
nationalist imagery of Turkish oppression, it hinges upon the inter-
pretation of empirical evidence for a few crucial events. The arguments
over Kosovo, which are less sharply focused, rely heavily upon crude
images of Ottoman oppression. The two cases thus represent the range of
issues involved in employing historical justifications drawing upon the
Ottoman past to warrant present-day claims.
* * * * *
O  A , the president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, attacked
Kuwait, and within twenty-four hours the Iraqi army had conquered the
country. By the time the occupying forces were driven out in February
, Kuwait had been systematically looted, and about six hundred
Kuwaitis taken to Iraq by Saddam’s secret police are thought to have been
executed. While many fellow Arabs were jealous of Kuwait’s oil wealth, the
brutality for which Saddam’s regime was well known should have aroused
sympathy for anyone falling under his control. Yet Saddam’s actions
proved surprisingly popular in some Arab countries, and his gamble that
the contravention of international law would go unchecked almost suc-
ceeded. His near-success is explained in part by his successful disguising
of his motives.
The attack on Kuwait arose from Saddam’s failure to defeat Iran in the
Gulf war of -. Once Iraq’s inept attempt to seize Iran’s oil-rich
province of Khuzistan had been checked, Iraq’s access to the Persian Gulf
was impeded as the war zone moved in  to the former border between
Iraq and Iran, the Shatt al-Arab waterway and the Faw peninsula. Before
risking another attack on Iran, Saddam aimed to secure his supply route by
1 Malcolm’s Bosnia and Kosovo are excellent examples.
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seizing Kuwait’s excellent port. He also needed money. With Kuwait’s
petroleum reserves added to Iraq’s, Iraq would become the dominant
voice in OPEC: the other leading producer, Saudi Arabia, would appease
him once he had annihilated their mutual neighbour. Saddam made no
secret of his wish to see world oil prices rise. Kuwait, which had funnelled
money to Iraq to keep the Iraqi military supplied with the advanced
weaponry it needed to stave off Iran’s ‘human wave’ offensives, made the
mistake of asking for repayment. By seizing the country, Saddam hoped
not only to pillage the Kuwaiti treasury but also to erase one of Iraq’s
biggest debts. Such reasons could hardly be proclaimed publicly.1
Several months before the invasion, Iraq began to complain that Kuwait
was stealing petroleum from an oil field that straddled their border.
Squabbles between states well endowed with hydrocarbons usually excite
little interest from those in lower-income brackets. Saddam’s attempt to
justify violence by reference to Ottoman history tacitly acknowledged the
need for a more stirring public-relations message. That later still he added
the promise to spend some of the newly acquired wealth on supporting the
Palestinian cause only sweetened the propaganda (and prompted the
Palestine Liberation Organization to support him, although it had received
more aid from the Gulf states, including Kuwait, than from Iraq). Saddam
drew upon a version of history well known to Iraqis, and it resonated with
them and with other Arabs.2
Iraq’s claim to Kuwait derived from the inclusion of both in the Ottoman
Empire. Although Iraq, as a country, was only created after Britain’s
victory over the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, the Ottomans had treated much of the
territory that became Iraq as a unified military frontier, the ‘Hıtta-i Irakiye’.
The notion that Iraq itself was simply the creation of the British following
their victory over the Ottomans in the First World War exaggerates the
artificiality of the state’s territorial boundaries. While pre-First World War
Kuwait was not part of the military frontier, it was part of the vilayet (prov-
ince) of Baghdad and, later, Basra. Saddam alluded to that apparently
shared history by claiming that Kuwait had historically been an integral
part of Iraq (the ‘Nineteenth Province’).
Saddam was not the first ruler of Iraq to make such a claim: the Hashem-
1 For standard accounts of the prelude to the Iraqi invasion, see M. E. Yapp, The Near East since the
First World War: A History to  (Harlow, ), and M. Kamrava, The Modern Middle East: A
Political History since the First World War (Berkeley, ).
2 See W. Khalidi, ‘The Gulf Crisis: Origins and Consequences’, Journal of Palestinian Studies, xx, 
(), -. Less satisfactory, despite its clearer emphasis on the efficacy of Saddam’s ‘anti-imperialist’
policy regarding Kuwait, is G. Joffe, ‘Middle Eastern Views of the Gulf Conflict and Its Aftermath’,
Review of International Studies, xix (), -.
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ite monarchy had done so in , and the republican regime of ‘Abd al-
Karim Qasim echoed it in . The latter caused a brief war scare that
brought British forces back to defend the newly independent state of
Kuwait, Britain’s protectorate since . Iraq repeatedly stated that the
territories that composed Kuwait and Iraq had been acknowledged inter-
nationally in the late nineteenth century as belonging to the Ottoman
Empire, and that the Ottoman imperial government had treated one as part
of the other.
The readiness of successive Iraqi regimes to cite Ottoman precedent
when it suited them does not imply a serious interest in the pre-independ-
ence period of history. As an Arab nationalist, Saddam never hid his
hatred for Ottoman imperialism: in , he even wrote an autobio-
graphical novel that featured his grandfather fighting heroically against ‘the
Turks’.1 They were a curse upon the Arab world, not only for their op-
pression, but also for their failure to fend off European advances. In
Saddam’s version of history, when ‘the Arabs’ saw the ‘opportunity to be
liberated from the darkness of the Ottoman era … malicious westerners’
intervened.2 In his view, by then the established view in Iraq, Britain
separated the Kuwaiti ‘branch’ from the Iraqi ‘trunk’ in , when the
government of India made a secret agreement with the sheikh of Kuwait,
Mubarak al-Sabah. The agreement was the first step towards a British
protectorate over the sheikhdom, out of which the post-Ottoman state of
Kuwait was created in .
As Saddam’s claim was baseless in international law, owing to Iraq’s
formal recognition in  of Kuwait’s independence, he appealed to the
court of public opinion, both in Iraq and abroad. By casting the attempt to
absorb Kuwait as the righting of a historical wrong perpetrated by immoral
European imperialists acting illegally, he tapped deep reserves of popular
resentment among those, both inside and outside the Middle East, who
attribute present-day problems to yesterday’s actions by the imperialist
West.
The evidence adduced by both sides in the dispute between Iran and
Kuwait was culled largely from British archives. It is symptomatic of the
Baathist regime’s contemptuous attitude towards the Ottomans that Iraqi
historians interested in the pre-national period are unable to read Ottoman
documents. The state’s lack of interest in promoting Ottoman studies is
lastingly regrettable, as much of Iraq’s collection of Ottoman-language
1 On this and others of Saddam’s flights of fancy, see N. Kristof, ‘An Iraqi Man of Letters’, New York
Times,  Oct. , p. A; H. Fattah, ‘Banned, Then Bootlegged, Saddam Hussein the Literary Lion
Roars Again’, New York Times,  June , p. A.
2 Saddam’s ‘Victory Day’ message,  Aug. , in O. Bengio, Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis: A
Collection of Documents (Tel Aviv, ), pp. , , , .
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documents will remain forever unread, reportedly having been destroyed
in the arson and looting that plagued Baghdad after the fall of Saddam’s
regime in . Although the claims made by Iraq and Kuwait cannot
easily be reconciled, neither’s may be dismissed as fabrication. Working
from similar sources, Iraqis and Kuwaitis draw different conclusions,
because the British records they rely on are ambiguous about the status of
Kuwait in the period preceding the expulsion of the Ottomans from the
Persian Gulf during the First World War. The ambiguity resulted from the
shift in Britain’s interests in the region and the shifting interests of its local
informants. The British, who lacked a permanent representative at Kuwait
before , had to rely on hearsay for intelligence. The result was a
plentiful supply of contradictory anecdotal evidence, available to both
Iraqis and Kuwaitis.
Each side had to make the best use of a handful of uncontested facts,
drawn from British records, about the last half-century of Ottoman rule in
the Gulf region. The events of three years stand out in significance. The
first was -, when ‘Abdallah al-Sabah (sheikh of Kuwait from  to
) accepted the position of kaymakam (governor) of the newly created
Ottoman kaza (district) of Kuwait. The kaza and the new mutasarrıflık
(sub-province) of Nejd (comprising what is now eastern Saudi Arabia and
Qatar) were added to the vilayet of Baghdad in . Upon ‘Abdallah’s
death, his brother and successor, Muhammad (-), assumed the
position of kaymakam, as did yet another brother, Mubarak (-), in
, a year after he had assassinated Muhammad. From - until the
First World War, the sheikh of Kuwait held a formal title and received
(intermittently) an official stipend, and the Ottoman flag flew over Kuwait
and on Kuwaiti ships. Iraq and Kuwait agree that Kuwait was tied politic-
ally to the Mesopotamian provinces of the Ottoman Empire.1 They dis-
agree about the nature of the tie.
The second year was , when a representative of the government of
India made a secret agreement with Mubarak that gave Britain a veto over
the admission of other foreign agents accredited to him and the granting of
concessions that might enable foreigners to gain effective control over any
Kuwaiti territory. In return, the government of India paid Mubarak ,
rupees and promised him Britain’s ‘good offices’. Although the agreement
was kept secret until , it marks the first formal international recognition
of Kuwait’s autonomy.2
1 The facts as revealed in British records are presented in the standard-setting accounts of the period:
J. B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, - (Oxford, ), and B. C. Busch, Britain and the
Persian Gulf, - (Berkeley, ).
2 ‘Exclusive Agreement: The Kuwayti Shaykh and Britain,  Jan. ’, in Diplomacy in the Near and
Middle East: A Documentary Record, -, ed. J. C. Hurewitz (Princeton, ), pp. -.
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The third year was , in which a draft Anglo-Ottoman convention
recognized Kuwait to be an ‘autonomous’ kaza of the Ottoman Empire. It
also delimited Kuwait’s boundaries along a line that the present-day Iraq-
Kuwait border generally follows. The convention was ratified by the Otto-
man government, but not by the British government, before the outbreak
of Anglo-Ottoman hostilities in November  halted the British ratifi-
cation process.1
These events are difficult to reconcile. Scholars from outside the Gulf
expert in modern legal theory, who have tried to reconcile them, also have
relied almost exclusively on British sources. David Finnie, who sym-
pathizes with Kuwait’s claims but acknowledges that the Kuwaiti-Ottoman
relationship remains obscure, devotes most of his study to the post-
period.2 Majid Khadduri, who tries to establish the nature of the relation-
ship,3 comes to the odd conclusion that the agreement of  was prob-
ably legally valid because the Ottoman claim to Kuwait was ‘the legacy of
various legal transactions made at a time when the Ottoman territories …
were considered outside the pale of International Law.’4 Thus, the niceties
of international law could be ignored. Such an argument failed to satisfy
British officials who worried about the legal status of Kuwait in the early
twentieth century. They were well aware that the Ottoman Empire had
been recognized formally as part of the Concert of Europe, with the full
legal rights under international law enjoyed by other European states, in
the treaty of Paris of .
Iraqi historians, who naturally highlight the events between  and
 ‒ when Kuwait was formally incorporated into the vilayet of Baghdad
until , when it passed into the newly formed vilayet of Basra, itself
reabsorbed in  into Baghdad until reconstituted in  ‒ challenge
the legitimacy of everything that happened later.5 They stress the use of the
Ottoman flag, the acceptance of the office of kaymakam and its sub-
servience to the valis of Baghdad and Basra in the provincial chain of com-
mand, and Kuwaiti participation in Ottoman military expeditions to
eastern Arabia in  and Qatar in . In their view, the agreement of
 was illegal and, not having been recognized formally by other parties,
1 Anglo-Ottoman Draft Convention on the Persian Gulf Area,  July , Diplomacy in the Near and
Middle East, ed. Hurewitz, pp. -.
2 D. Finnie, Shifting Lines in the Sand: Kuwait’s Elusive Frontier with Iraq (Cambridge, MA, ), p.
.
3 M. Khadduri, ‘Iraq’s Claim to the Sovereignty of Kuwayt’, International Law and Politics, xxiii
(), -.
4 Khadduri, ‘Iraq’s Claim’, p. .
5 M. al-Dawud, M. al-Najjar, and ‘A. al-‘Ani, Al Huwiyya al-‘Iraqiyya lil-Kuwayt: Dirasa Ta’rikhiyya
Watha’iqiyya (Baghdad, ), especially pp. -; M. al-Najjar and N. al-Hadithi, Suqut al-Tajzi’a:
Dirasa Ta’rikhiyya ‘an ‘Awda Qada’ al-Kuwayt ila al-‘Iraq (Baghdad, ), especially pp. -.
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is irrelevant to the issue of the degree of Kuwait’s autonomy. The con-
vention of  confirmed that Kuwait was part of the vilayet of Basra, with
autonomy limited to municipal affairs. That Britain failed to ratify the
convention negated its validity as a legal precedent for establishing the
border between Iraq and Kuwait. Feroz Ahmad, who is not Iraqi, ques-
tions the legality of the agreement of  without endorsing Iraq’s
territorial claim.1
The counter-argument presented by Kuwaiti and other Arab historians
belittles the events between  and .2 In their view, Kuwait’s tie to
the Ottoman Empire was religious, not political. In an echo of a medieval
European ruler’s allegiance to the pope, Kuwait flew the Ottoman flag as a
symbol of spiritual rather than political allegiance. The title of kaymakam
was not functional but honorific, and Kuwait’s forces joined Ottoman
military campaigns only when it suited the sheikh’s interests, when they
served as allies, not as subordinates. These historians argue that the nature
of Kuwait’s relationship with the Ottoman Empire was understood by the
British, whose agreement with Mubarak would have been worthless had he
not been, in effect, independent. The convention of  demonstrated
that Kuwait’s autonomy was recognized by both Ottomans and British,
even if administrative snags prevented the British from ratifying it before
the outbreak of war. This version is accepted by Peter Sluglett, in an
earlier article in this journal, who, like Finnie, relies largely on the same
British sources as both Iraqis and Kuwaitis.3
The crux of the disagreement is the nature of the relationship between
Kuwait and the vilayets of Baghdad and Basra, in particular the view of the
relationship held by Kuwaitis and the Ottoman state at the time. The
British view of it varied. Before  and the rumours about first Russian,
and then German, plans to terminate the railways they were building in the
Middle East at the Gulf, British officials either ignored Kuwait or acknow-
ledged it to be Ottoman territory. As late as April , the ambassador at
Istanbul, Sir Clare Ford, stated explicitly to the Ottoman foreign minister,
Said Pasha, that Britain recognized Ottoman sovereignty over the territory
between Basra and Qatif, a port on the coast of Arabia slightly to the north-
west of the Qatar peninsula.4 The British volte-face in  is best
1 F. Ahmad, ‘A Note on the International Status of Kuwait before November ’, International
Journal of Middle East Studies, xxiv (), -,  which bases its comments on Busch, Persian Gulf.
2 Al-Kuwayt Wujudan wa Hududan: al-Haqa’iq al-Mawdu‘iyya wal-Iddi‘a’at al-‘Iraqiyya (Cairo,
), esp. pp. -. A paraphrase of this work appeared in English as Kuwait: Statehood and Bound-
aries (Kuwait, ), see esp. pp. -.
3 P. Sluglett, ‘The Resilience of a Frontier: Ottoman and Iraqi Claims to Kuwait, -’, Inter-
national History Review, xxiv (), -.
4 Government of India, Foreign Department: Precis of Koweit Affairs, -,  ed. J. A. Saldanha
(Simla, ), p. . An extract of the ambassador's report is in Government of India, Foreign Depart-
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illustrated by the viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, who had stated in a book
he published in , Persia and the Persian Question, that Kuwait
belonged to the territory over which ‘the Ottoman dominion is established
without dispute’, words Germany used against Britain in later disputes
over the Berlin-to-Baghdad railway.1 Three months after he took office, in
January , Curzon, with the approval of the India office and support of
the foreign office, directed the political agent in the Gulf to conclude an
agreement with the sheikh of Kuwait.
The shift in Curzon’s, and Britain’s, attitude was a matter of political
expediency, not reasoned legal argument. The uncertainty about Kuwait’s
legal status, and the government’s unwillingness to address the problem,
are revealed in the minutes of a subcommittee of the committee for
imperial defence from March . To the question of ‘how we stand juris-
prudentially in Koweit’, the under-secretary of state for India, Sir Rich-
mond Ritchie, replied: ‘Whenever we (in the India office) write to the
foreign office we always say, “The sheikh of Koweit, with whose status the
secretary of state for foreign affairs is acquainted;” and similarly when the
foreign office write to us they adopt a similar form.’2 By default, it is left to
Ottoman documents to define the nature of Kuwait’s relationship with the
Ottoman Empire.
* * * * *
K’   the Ottoman state can only be understood by
recognizing the pressure to change (be it termed ‘modernization’, ‘West-
ernization’, or ‘secularization’) applied to the empire. Since the end of the
seventeenth century, every major European state except Prussia/Germany
had seized direct or indirect control over lands and populations that
formed part of the Ottoman domains. The threat of partition continued
until the dissolution of the empire in , in spite of the formal recog-
nition of Ottoman rights in . Conscious of the need to use the legal
tools formally accorded to it, the Ottoman Empire sought, after , to
mark its territory with the symbols used by the European powers: flags and
legally defined administrative structures that demonstrated effective con-
trol. The difficulty lay in finding a way that did not destabilize social
structures that still operated according to traditional practices unaffected
by modern ideas of international law and the centralized state.
            
ment: Precis of Turkish Expansion on the Arab Littoral of the Persian Gulf and Hasa and Qatif Affairs,
ed. J. A. Saldanha (Calcutta, ), p. .
1 G. N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question (London, ), ii. . On Germany, see Busch,
Persian Gulf, p. , and J. Plass, England zwischen Rußland und Deutschland: der Persische Golf in
der Britischen Vorkriegspolitik, - (Hamburg, ).
2 Quoted in Plass, Der Persische Golf, p. .
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The vali of Baghdad in -, Midhat Pasha, found a method accept-
able to both the central government and the Kuwaitis. On  February ,
he sent to Istanbul the following report on Kuwait and how it came to fly
the Ottoman flag:
The place known as Kuwait is a merchant port of two or three thousand houses
lying on the coast twenty-four hours south of Basra. While in the early days it was
one of those areas attached to Basra, it later somehow gradually won the status of
an independent community, because geographic barriers prevented its supervision
and it thus was left on its own. The Franks [Christian Europeans] considering it a
‘Republic’, it is so marked on [their] maps and is recognized as completely separ-
ate and independent. The people of this place, an old part of the well-protected
[Ottoman] domains, all belong to the Sunni madhhab [the collective body of four
schools of tradition-based Islamic law, the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi‘i, and Hanbali]
and, all of them being traders, they fly a special form of the Ottoman flag on most
of their seven or eight hundred ships. Nevertheless, because they did not want to
obey Basra in the past, [Kuwait] remained in an isolated and independent con-
dition and administration. In spite of that, given the current condition of Bahrain
under British domination and foreigners’ schemes to send ships to seize the Hasa
and Qatif coasts lying between Kuwait and Bahrain [by this Midhat refers to
suspected British schemes to seize what is now the Gulf coast of Saudi Arabia,
following the government of India’s intervention in Bahrain in  to install a
sheikh of its choosing], correspondence was initiated through various channels for
the purpose of finding a means to bring Kuwait under [Ottoman] control and ad-
ministration. It is clear that, once foreigners become entrenched on the [Hasa-
Qatif] coast, they will come in turn to Kuwait. Were we to bring this Kuwait under
proper administration, it would smooth the way to saving the area beyond it
through the naval force now being organized in Basra, and it is probable that
[then] a solution for even the Bahrain problem could be found. Since the sheikhs
of Kuwait have long received income from  kare of dates [from Faw, south of
Basra in Iraq], worth -, gurus, this income was cut off, in order to ease the
proposition [that Kuwait come under Ottoman control].
During my most recent trip to Basra, [Kuwait’s] sheikhs and elders were
brought there. Regarding their comments and the wishes and desires which they
showed, [they said that] while they are proud to be subjects of the Sublime [Otto-
man] State, their basic fear is to come under impositions such as customs duties
and taxes. Since it is the case that the Sublime State in no way needs them, and its
basic goal is [to establish its] patronage and protection, the requirements of the
situation on this subject were explained to them at length. Then they drew up and
submitted a protocol, which included the request that the current sheikh be given
the title and office of kaymakam. It also asked for the official appointment of
judges with permission to exercise their authority as before according to the Shafi‘i
madhhab, since most of the people of the said town are followers of the Shafi‘i
practice ‒  although there are also some followers of the Maliki and Hanbali
madhhabs as well ‒  and sharia judicial authority is organized according to the
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Shafi‘i school of law. The protocol requests also that imperial warrants be given to
five khutbi mosques [the main mosques in which congregants gathered for the
Friday midday prayers and sermon, during which the sultan’s name presumably
would be invoked thereafter, the customary acknowledgement of political legitim-
acy] from among the sacred mosques [of Kuwait]. The necessary decrees have
been given in writing, and the matter of the letters of appointment and imperial
warrants has been sent by telegraph to the illustrious interior ministry. It has been
decided in accordance with current needs that, in order to give [Kuwait] a greater
show of order, one hundred military gendarmes should be stationed there, with
their salaries paid by [the Kuwaiti leaders]. This, too, should be mutually agreed
and brought into effect immediately upon the imminent return of the current
kaymakam, who is at present in the Hijaz.1
The year after writing this report, Midhat called at Kuwait in November
, on his way to inspect newly conquered Ottoman territory in eastern
Arabia. The sheikh-kaymakam ‘Abdallah had come to Faw to meet
Midhat, who then went out of his way to visit him in Kuwait and to tour
the town with its magnificent harbour. His description of the visit embel-
lishes, and alters, parts of his previous report.
First, Midhat justifies the detour to Kuwait by noting the attention and
services rendered by the sheikh of Kuwait:
As for ‘Abdallah al-Sabah, who was appointed kaymakam, he has faithfully and
zealously provided good service in support of the military [expeditionary] force
from the beginning of the Nejd affair [the occupation of eastern Arabia], without
recompense, by sea with more than eighty boats, and his brother Mubarak al-
Sabah likewise by land with a large force. [Midhat then remarks upon the pleasant
and healthy climate of Kuwait, which has -, houses but no water supply or
cultivated land] … The inhabitants have lived in security until now. The terri-
tory’s harbour being very nice and wide, it is protected from attacks that Arab
[tribesmen] might launch from the sea; by land it is surrounded by a number of
tribes that are under its patronage and control. The community and its prosperity
improve day by day. As for the people of the town itself, most are of the Shafi‘i
madhhab, but there are a few of the Hanafi, Hanbali, and Maliki madhhabs as well.
There are no Jews or Christians, nor any Wahhabis or Shi‘is. All of the place’s
people being engaged in trade or maritime crafts, they have [a fleet] consisting of
more than one thousand boats, the smaller of which are used for pearl hunting and
for transport to nearby ports such as Basra and Bender Bushire [on the coast of
Iran]. They use the large boats to trade with the coasts of India and Baluchistan,
with Zanzibar and the ports of Yemen. The Kuwait kaymakamlık [office, or as
implied here the territory under the control, of the kaymakam], which is attached
to the Basra mutasarrıflık [sub-provincial governorship], is in the charge of the
1 Vali, Baghdad to g[rand] v[izier],  Feb.  [Istanbul,] B[aπbakanlık] O[smanlı] A[rπivi], U[sul-i]
∑[rade] D[osya] .
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aforementioned ‘Abdallah al-Sabah, and for legal affairs there is a [religious court]
judge. Although issues of organization and security are conducted under the
supervision of the kaymakam, and legal affairs under that of the judge, there are in
the territory no [Ottoman] officials or employees such as officers or gendarmes or
guards, other than the kaymakam, because there is not even one [penny] of rev-
enue due to, or expenditure by, either the central government or the kaymakam,
and because the incidence of complaints and disputes that would involve the
[Ottoman] government is rare, the inhabitants really all being like members of a
family.1
Several points leap out from the two documents. Geography made
Kuwait neither politically dependent upon, nor answerable to, Basra. It not
only had socio-economic ties to southern Iraq but also ties throughout the
Gulf and Arabia that reached as far as India and East Africa. Owing to its
autonomy, Midhat had to apply financial pressure to persuade Kuwait’s
leaders to come to Basra, acknowledge Ottoman suzerainty, and recognize
the legal symbols of Ottoman control: the Ottoman flag and an Ottoman
administrator (the sheikh-kaymakam). In turn, the Ottoman authorities
recognized the limits of what the Kuwaitis would accept, and their own in-
ability to control the town of Kuwait; an earlier Ottoman scheme to collect
customs duties had been dropped in  owing to the certainty of Kuwaiti
resistance.2 The Ottoman state thus granted Kuwait a number of excep-
tional privileges, seen to be in operation, and confirmed, during Midhat’s
visit. Unlike every other part of the vilayet of Baghdad (including the
mutasarrıflık of Nejd after ), Kuwait never was liable for customs or
other Ottoman taxes, its inhabitants were not subject to military conscrip-
tion, and no Ottoman official other than the sheikh-kaymakam resided
there. Two kaymakamlıks, Kuwait and Qurna, now a town in Iraq, were
dependent on Basra; in the Basra provincial gazette of -, twenty-two
officials are listed as serving in Qurna, where normal Ottoman direct
administration had been introduced, whereas only the kaymakam is listed
under Kuwait.3 Although Midhat’s first report suggests the desirability of
posting a detachment of gendarmes in Kuwait, no such force was ever
raised. Next, again unlike the Ottomans’ conduct in any other part of the
empire except perhaps the Hijaz,4 the Ottomans made no attempt to alter
the judicial system or to appoint judges learned in Hanafi law, the
madhhab followed by the Ottoman state. This is particularly remarkable
given Midhat’s statement in the second report that a few Hanafis lived in
1 Vali, Baghdad, to gv,  Jan.   [BOA], ∑[rade] D[ahiliye] , encl. .
2 Gv to vali, Baghdad,  May,  Oct.  [BOA], Ayniyat /,  .
3 Basra Vilayeti Salnamesi (Basra, -), pp. -.
4 On the Ottoman Hijaz, see W. Ochsenwald, Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz
under Ottoman Control, - (Columbus, ).
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Kuwait. Even in mid-nineteenth-century Tunis, a territory only loosely
controlled by the Ottoman state but with a small Hanafi population, a
Hanafi court operated in parallel with the Maliki, the madhhab of the over-
whelming majority of Tunisian Muslims.1 The exemptions that Kuwait
enjoyed demonstrate that the Ottomans did not intend fully to incorporate
it into the administrative system of Baghdad and Basra, even to the extent
that they incorporated the mutasarrıflık of Nejd.
Having granted the sheikhs and inhabitants of Kuwait a special status
within the Ottoman Empire, the imperial government proved unwilling for
almost thirty years to try to alter it. This hesitancy may be attributed to
consciousness within imperial government circles that the loyalty of a frag-
mented, tribal society depended upon treating the population in a straight-
forward manner by upholding agreements made with them.2 When pro-
vincial officials in Basra suspected the Kuwaitis in the s and s of
being heavily involved in the illicit arms trade that supplied the Bedouin
tribes with ever-better means of challenging Ottoman authority in the
Arabian and Iraqi deserts, the imperial government rejected their requests
to be allowed to send gunboats and troops to Kuwait to control the gun-
running and anticipate a British occupation.3 After Muhammad al-Sabah
was murdered in , a petition to be allowed to assume direct control
over Kuwait contributed to the dismissal of the vali  of Basra, Hamdi
Pasha, since the position and duties of kaymakam had always been left in
the hands of the sheikhs of Kuwait.4
Only after a year of turmoil in Kuwait and the surrounding areas fol-
lowing the assassination in May  of the second kaymakam, Muham-
mad, by his half-brother Mubarak (who had taken part in the Ottoman ex-
pedition to Arabia in ) did the imperial government decide with
reluctance to intervene directly in Kuwaiti affairs; but only to the extent of
replacing Mubarak, the cause of the turmoil, with a member of the al-
Sabah family likely to prove more amenable to Ottoman advice.5 The deci-
sion was not carried out, owing to the administrative turmoil afflicting the
vilayet of Basra: instead, Mubarak was himself appointed kaymakam in
December . Despite the imperial government’s worries after 
about the extent of British influence in Kuwait, it failed to persuade
1 On Ottoman Tunis, see L. C. Brown, The Tunisia of Ahmad Bey, - (Princeton, ), and J.
Abu Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (Cambridge, ).
2 On the need for straightforward administration in the Gulf, see memo, vice-consul, London,  March
 [BOA], Y[ıldız] E[sas] E[vrakı] ///.
3 Memo, naval commander, Basra,   Jan.  [BOA], Yıldız Bab-i Asafi Resmî /; memo,
mutasarrıf, Nejd,  Jan. , YEE / //; report of Qatar uprising investigation team, 
Sept. , YEE ///, pp. -.
4 Min[ister of] int[erior] to gv,   May  [BOA], B[ab-i Ali] E[vrak] O[dası Gelen-Giden] .
5 Memo, min. int.,  April , BEO ; memo, council of ministers,  May , BEO .
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Mubarak to allow it to post at Kuwait any other Ottoman official, such as a
harbour master. Such success in withstanding the imperial government’s
intermittent pressure may have led British officials to suppose that Kuwait
was independent.
In Ottoman eyes, the Ottoman flag and the title of kaymakam were not
meaningless: they were meant to establish beyond reasonable doubt that
Kuwait was Ottoman territory. The successive sheikh-kaymakams, ‘Ab-
dallah, Muhammad, and Mubarak, who received stipends from the im-
perial government, were expected, in return, to maintain order and to
uphold Ottoman rights in their territory.1 Even though Mubarak made the
agreement with the government of India in  before he began to receive
the stipend, he had already accepted the position of kaymakam, with its
rights and responsibilities, which he confirmed by accepting the stipend
when it was offered. He had acknowledged most clearly in assuming the
office of kaymakam in  that Kuwait was Ottoman territory, and he re-
affirmed his loyalty to the sultan in  and , despite signing the
agreement with the government of India. According to Britain’s under-
standing of constitutional relationships, he had given up the right to make
agreements with foreign states. Thus, Kuwait’s claim that Mubarak was an
independent ruler not tied to the Ottoman state is doubtful.
Mubarak’s actions followed from the nature of political power in
nineteenth-century Arabia,2 where nothing resembled the impersonal, cor-
porate state familiar to Europeans. Such political authority as was recog-
nized by most of Arabia’s inhabitants was held by the leading families that
provided the sheikhs of tribes or towns, like the Al Sabah in Kuwait.
Allegiance to an individual was revocable. As authority rested with the
family, not the individual, a sheikh who failed to serve the community, or
was not politically astute, could be displaced by a relative. This happened
in , when Mubarak murdered Muhammad and another half-brother,
Jarrah. The imperial government recognized customary familial authority
when debating whether to replace him with another member of the Al
Sabah in . The limits to the authority of any single member of the Al
Sabah, even when recognized as sheikh, is illustrated by Midhat’s com-
ment that no taxes were collected in Kuwait. Mubarak’s position was
1 Imperial decree,  Aug. , ID -M-; gv to vali, Baghdad,  Sept. , Ayniyat /;
vali, Basra, to min. int.,  Feb. , UID .
2 See P. Lienhardt, ‘The Authority of Shaikhs in the Gulf: An Essay in Nineteenth-Century History’, in
Arabian Studies, ed. R. B. Serjeant and R. L. Bidwell (London, ), ii. -. On Gulf sheikhs’
ability to improve their status by manipulating Anglo-Ottoman rivalry, see F. F. Anscombe, ‘The Otto-
man Role in the Gulf ’, in The Persian Gulf in History, ed. L. Potter (New York, forthcoming ).
For particulars on Kuwait, see F. F. Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, and Qatar (New York, ), ch. -, and J. Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and
Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (New York, ), pp. -.
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exceptionally vulnerable, under threat not only from followers of his mur-
dered brothers, but also owing to the probable displeasure of the Ottoman
state, whose representative the late sheikh-kaymakam had been.
Mubarak’s actions are explained by the need to buttress his authority.
The office of kaymakam, which he worked hard to be appointed to by
Kuwait’s Ottoman overlord, nullified the threat of Ottoman action over the
murder of his predecessor. The agreement with the government of India
provided insurance not only against the Ottomans but also local rivals,
who might have offered privileges to the British in return for recognition
once Mubarak was overthrown. The agreement had the second advantage
that, in binding his descendants, it increased the likelihood that his line
would squeeze rival lineages of the Al Sabah out of contention for the lead-
ership of Kuwait. With the backing of a European great power accustomed
to dealing with centralized states and preferring to work with one ruler
rather than a family or group of families, Mubarak extended the customary
rights of Al Sabah sheikhs over Kuwait’s inhabitants.1 In , he intro-
duced a system of tax collection, for the first time. Nonetheless, in ,  he
explained to an Ottoman army officer who had deserted, Hüseyin Hüsni,
that he had accepted the government of India’s protection only for himself
and his personal rights; the land and other property of Kuwait belonged to
the Ottoman state.2 In his own eyes, he maintained multiple allegiances.
If Kuwait’s claim always to have been independent seems doubtful,
Iraq’s claim that Britain carved Kuwait out of Iraq during the late Ottoman
period is more so. Ignoring the fact that the state of Iraq is a post-Ottoman
creation, it is clear from the Ottoman records that Kuwait never was fully
incorporated into any of the vilayets later incorporated in Iraq by Britain
and the League of Nations after the First World War. The imperial Otto-
man government recognized the autonomy of the sheikh in managing
Kuwait’s internal affairs: it ratified the Anglo-Ottoman convention of 
so quickly because the terms both confirmed the relationship between
Kuwait and the imperial government settled in , and formally recog-
nized Kuwait as Ottoman territory, a step both the foreign office and
government of India had avoided taking since .
The Anglo-Ottoman convention also settled the territorial extent of
Kuwait. Iraq, even when not contesting Kuwait’s claim to have been inde-
pendent since , has claimed that Britain, under the convention, de-
limited the border between Kuwait and the remainder of the vilayet of
Basra along a line that was too generous to Kuwait.3 That delimitation set
1 See, in particular, S. Alghanim, The Reign of Mubarak Al Sabah: Shaikh of Kuwait, - (Lon-
don, ).
2 H. Hüsni, Necid Kıta’sının Ahval-i Umumiyesi (Istanbul, ), pp. -.
3 See Finnie, Kuwait’s Frontier with Iraq, esp. chs. , -.
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the border of today. The Ottoman records ignore the issue of the border’s
correct location. The area in question was an economic wasteland, without
permanent settlements: running a line through it, on one side of which the
sheikh of Kuwait would exercise ‘authority’, on the other the vali of Basra,
would have seemed strange to those familiar with the area before . The
settlements closest to the frontier ‒ Zubayr, Umm Qasr, and Safwan ‒
were placed on Basra’s side of the line because they had been administered
from Basra, to the extent that they were administered at all, at least from
the beginning of the twentieth century.1 Although Midhat’s second report
states that Kuwait was surrounded by tribes ‘under its patronage and
control’, the point south of Zubayr, Umm Qasr, and Safwan at which
Mubarak’s influence became paramount (if it existed) had to be guessed.
The imperial government’s repeated requests to officials in Basra for infor-
mation about such spheres of influence show that it did not know of any
areas under Basra’s control that were placed in  on Kuwait’s side of the
frontier.2 The border’s placement in  cannot be said to have been
unjust at the time.
* * * * *
T   of states formerly part of the Ottoman Empire
written by all sides in the Iraq-Kuwait dispute are flawed. The Ottoman
records show that Kuwait, though not independent in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, was autonomous. It was not directly con-
trolled by the vilayet of Baghdad or, later, Basra, even between  and
, the period of most effective Ottoman authority in the Gulf.
If the extent of Ottoman territorial sovereignty or the structure of Otto-
man provincial administration in the late nineteenth century were valid
grounds for redrawing present-day frontiers, Iraq would have a better
claim to the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia and to Qatar than to Kuwait.
They formed part of the mutasarrıflık of Nejd, which first the vilayet of
Baghdad and then the vilayet of Basra administered from  to .
Such a claim would count for little in the court of public opinion, not only
on account of geography, given the distance separating Qatar and the
Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia from Iraq, but also because British
imperialism could not be blamed. Basra lost control of Nejd in  when
‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud (founder of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia) and his
Arab followers evicted the Ottomans by force, the sort of activity attributed
implausibly by Saddam Hussein to his grandfather. An Iraqi historical
claim to Saudi Arabia would be derided; the Iraqi historical claim to
1 Chief imperial secretary to gv,  Dec. , UID .
2 Gv to valis, Basra and Baghdad,  March , BEO ; gv to vali muavini, Basra, ,  Feb., 
March , BEO , , ; vali muavini to gv,  Feb. .
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Kuwait deserves the same treatment. To justify the execution by force of a
claim based upon history requires the production of impossibly indisput-
able historical evidence in order to outweigh the wishes and recent experi-
ence of the target population. Kuwaitis, who have lived their entire lives in
a country separated politically from Iraq for nearly a century, have shown
to date little sympathy for the Iraqi claim. Nor should anyone else. Iraq’s
claim to Kuwait merits inclusion in the ranks of policy positions mas-
querading as Ottoman history.
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